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     Section 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(IRTPA) temporarily amended two federal terrorist assistance prohibitions. Those 
amendments expire on December 31, 2006, P.L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3762-764 (2004). 
Under the provisions of H.R. 3199, as passed by the House, and S. 1389, as passed by the 
Senate, the amendments would become permanent. 
 
     In response to court decisions that found certain of their central terms 
unconstitutionally vague, section 6603 amended the federal statutes that outlaw 
assistance to terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations, 18 U.S.C. 2339A, 2339B. 
Initial judicial reaction suggests they may still be considered vague. Section 6603 
temporarily rejected a narrow construction of the knowledge requirements under section 
2339B, an interpretation which might have dissipated any vagueness problems. 
 
     Section 6603 expanded the overseas application of section 2339B as well. It permits 
federal prosecution of an act proscribed in section 2339B and committed entirely abroad 
by a foreign national if the offender can be brought to this country for trial. 
 
     Section 2339A outlaws providing material support or resources with the intent that 
they be used for the commission of certain predicate terrorism offenses. Section 6603 
enlarged the list of predicate offenses to include any federal crime of terrorism (18 U.S.C. 
2332b(g)(5)(B)) and added two crimes to the list, 18 U.S.C. 1361 (destruction of federal 
property) and 18 U.S.C. 2156 (production of defective national defense material). 
 
      Finally, section 6603 added an immunity provision under which an individual or 
entity who provides assistance in violation of section 2339B may not be prosecuted in 
certain instances if the offense was committed with the prior approval of the Secretary of 
State and the Attorney General.  
 
      This report appears in abridged form – without footnotes, appendix, and some 
citations to authority – as CRS Report RS22222, Material Support of Terrorists and 
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Material Support of Terrorist and Foreign 





     Section 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
temporarily amends two federal terrorist assistance prohibitions, P.L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 
3762-764 (2004). The amendments expire on December 31, 2006. Under the provisions 
of H.R. 3199, as passed by the House, and S. 1389, as passed by the Senate, the 
amendments would be made permanent. In their present form the amendments, found in 
section 6603 of the act, temporarily: 
 
- amend the definitions of “material support or resources,” “training,” and “expert 
advice or assistance” as those terms are used in 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B, and 
of “personnel” as used in section 2339B; 
 
- add a more explicit knowledge requirement to section 2339B; 
 
- expand the extraterritorial jurisdiction reach of section 2339B; 
 
- enlarge the list of federal crimes of terrorism, 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5); 
 
- add the enlarged list of federal crimes of terrorism to the inventory of predicate 
offenses for 18 U.S.C. 2339A (material support for the commission of certain 
terrorist crimes) and consequently for 18 U.S.C. 2339B (material support for 
designated terrorist organizations); and 
 
- preclude prosecution for certain violations committed with the approval of the 
Secretary of State and concurrence of the Attorney General (e.g., stings). 
 
Material Support: Definitions 
 
     Sections  2339A  and  2339B  are proximity  crimes.     They  proscribe certain 
conduct because of its proximity to other crimes, in this case terrorist offenses.       
Section 2339A outlaws providing, attempting to provide, or conspiring to provide, 
material support or resources for the commission of any of several designated federal 
crimes  that  a  terrorist  might commit;1      section  2339B  outlaws  providing,  attempting 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1       18 U.S.C. 2339A(a) (“Whoever provides material support or resources or conceals or 






to provide, or conspiring to provide, material support or resources to a designated foreign 
terrorist organization.2 
 
     Section 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Prevention of Terrorism Act made 
several amendments to section 2339A and 2339B in response to judicial decisions that 
either found them unconstitutionally vague or suggested a demanding mens rea 
(knowledge) requirement.3     Section 2339A  contains a  definition of  “material support  
or resources” that  applies to both sections, 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b).      Some courts had 
been  particularly troubled  by the  uncertain sweep  of the terms  “training,”  
“personnel,” and  “expert advice  or assistance” used in the definition.   The Ninth 





knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of 
section 32 [destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities], 37 [violence at international airports], 81 
[arson within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction], 175 [biological weapons offenses], 
229 [chemical weapons offenses], 351 [congressional, cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination 
and kidnaping], 831 [nuclear material offenses], 842(m) or (n) [plastic explosives offenses], 
844(f) or (i) [burning or bombing federal property or property used in interstate or foreign 
commerce], 930(c) [killing or attempted killing of another during an attack on a federal facility 
with a dangerous weapon], 956 [conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim overseas], 1114 [killing 
or attempted killing of federal officers and employees], 1116 [murder or manslaughter of foreign 
officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons], 1203 [hostage taking], 1361 
[destruction of federal property], 1362 [destruction of communication lines, stations, or systems], 
1363 [destruction of property within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States], 1366 [destruction of an energy facility], 1751 [presidential assassination or kidnaping], 
1992 [wrecking trains], 1993 [terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass 
transportation systems], 2155 [destruction of national defense material], 2156 [production of 
defective national defense material], 2280 [violence against maritime navigation], 2281 [violence 
against maritime fixed platforms], 2332 [violence against Americans overseas], 2332a [weapons 
of mass destruction], 2332b [multinational terrorism], 2332f [bombing public places or facilities], 
or 2340A [torture] of this title, section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284) 
[sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel], section 46502 [aircraft piracy] or 60123(b) [destruction of 
gas pipeline facilities] of title 49, or any offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) (except for 
sections 2339A and 2339B), or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment of an 
escape from the commission of any such violation, or attempts or conspires to do such an act, 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any 
person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. . .”) (language temporarily 
added by section 6603 in italics). 
 
2 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1)(“Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign 
terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be 
imprisoned for any term of years or for life. . .”). 
 
3 A Review of the Tools to Fight Terrorism Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on 
theJudiciary (Senate Hearing), 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004)(joint prepared statement of Assistant 
Attorney General Daniel J. Bryant and Counterterrorism Section Chief Barry Sabin), available on 






Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137-138 (9th Cir. 2000);4 “personnel” because the 
term might be thought to envelope the efforts of a simple advocate;5 “training” because 
the term might be thought to sweep in benign academic instruction;6 and “expert advice 
or assistance” because, like “personnel” and “training,” it might be read to include First 




4 In Humanitarian Law Project, the District Court had granted a preliminary injunction which 
following the appeal it made permanent, a decision which again a panel of the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Department of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th 
Cir. 2003). This second appellate decision was vacated in favor of an en banc decision which 
announced that “[w]ith respect to the appellants’ First Amendment challenge to sections 302 and 
303 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, we affirm the district court’s 
order dated October 2, 2001, for the reasons set out in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno. In 
light of Congress’ recent amendment to the challenged statute, the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, we affirm the judgment in part, as set forth above, vacate the 
judgment and injunction regarding the terms ‘personnel’ and ‘training’ . . .” Humanitarian Law 
Project v. United States Department of Justice, 393 F.3d 902, 902 (9th Cir. 2004)(internal citations 
omitted). 
 
5 “It is easy to see how someone could be unsure about what AEDPA prohibits with the use of the 
term ‘personnel,’ as it blurs the line between protected expression and unprotected conduct. 
Someone who advocates the cause of PKK could be seen as supplying them with personnel; it 
even fits under the government’s rubric of freeing up resources, since having an independent 
advocate frees up members to engage in terrorist activities instead of advocacy. But advocacy is 
pure speech protected by the First Amendment. In order to keep the statute from trenching on 
such advocacy, the government urges that we read into it a requirement that the activity 
prohibited be performed ‘under the direction or control’ of the foreign terrorist organization. 
While we may construe a statute in such a way as to avoid constitutional questions, we are not 
authorized to rewrite the law so it will pass constitutional muster,” 205 F.3d at 1137-138 (internal 
citations omitted). 
 
6 “The term ‘training’ fares little better. Again, it is easy to imagine protected expression that falls 
within the bounds of this term. For example, a plaintiff who wishes to instruct members of a 
designated group on how to petition the United Nations to give aid to their group could plausibly 
decide that such protected expression falls within the scope of the term ‘training.’ The 
government insists that the term is best understood to forbid the imparting of skills to foreign 
terrorist organizations through training. Yet, presumably, this definition would encompass 
teaching international law to members of the designated organizations. The result would be 
different if the term ‘training’ were qualified to include only military training or training in 
terrorist activities,” 205 F.3d at 1138. 
 
7 “[T]he Court concludes that the term ‘expert advice or assistance,’ like the terms ‘training’ and 
‘personnel,’ is not sufficiently clear so as to allow persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited. Defendants have failed to adequately distinguish the 
provision of ‘expert advice and assistance’ from the provision of ‘training’ and ‘personnel’ in a 
way that allows the Court to reconcile its prior finding that the terms ‘training’ and ‘personnel’ 
are impermissibly vague, with a finding that the term ‘expert advice or assistance’ is not. 
Furthermore, Defendants’ contradictory arguments on the scope of the prohibition underscore the 
vagueness of the prohibition. The ‘expert advice or assistance’ Plaintiffs seek to offer includes 
advocacy and associational activities protected by the First Amendment, which Defendants 
concede are not prohibited under the USA PATRIOT Act. Despite this, the USA PATRIOT Act 
places no limitation on the type of expert advice and assistance which is prohibited, and instead 
bans the provision of all expert advice and assistance regardless of its nature. Thus, like the terms 





      Section 6603 supplied a new definition for “training”– “the term ‘training’ means 
instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general 
knowledge,” 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(2). As explained by Justice Department witnesses, “[the 
amendment] would also add a specific definition of ‘training’ in response to the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision that this term too was unconstitutionally vague. . . As an example, the 
court opined that the term conceivably could include teaching members of foreign 
terrorist organizations to use international human rights laws to resolve conflicts in a 
peaceful manner. [The amendment] would alleviate such concerns by limiting the term 
‘training’ to ‘instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to 
general knowledge’. . .”8 Critics might argue that the attempted fix appears to turn on the 
dubious premise that effective advocacy (e.g., peaceful conflict resolution through the use 
of human rights laws) is not a skill. 
 
     The same might be said of section 6603’s new definition of “expert advice or 
assistance” plucked from the Federal Rules of Evidence – “the term ‘expert advice or 
assistance’ means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge,” 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(3).9 
 
     In the case of both terms, however, section 6603 may rely on its section 2339B First 
Amendment disclaimer clause to answer the concern that the uncertain term might lead to 
prosecution of mere advocacy or other First Amendment protected activities – at least 
with regard to prosecutions under 2339B: “Nothing in this section shall be construed or 
applied so as to abridge the exercise of rights guaranteed under the First Amendment to 




unequivocally pure speech and advocacy protected by the First Amendment or encompass First  
Amendment protected activities,” Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F.Supp.2d 1185, 
1200-201 (C.D.Cal. 2004); see also, United States v. Sattar, 272 F.Supp.2d 348, 358-61 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 
8 Senate Hearing, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004)(joint prepared statement of Assistant Attorney 
General Daniel J. Bryant and Counterterrorism Section Chief Barry Sabin), available on July 29, 
2005 at [http://judiciary.senate.gov/print_ testimony.cfm?id =1301& wit_id=3133] 
 
9 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states, “If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts 
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness 
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case,” (emphasis added). 
 
10     The  decision  to limit the  disclaimer  clause to  section 2339B  may  have  been  influenced 
by  the view that in some instances, the uncertainty of the terms used to describe “material 
support or resources” may be less troubling in section 2339A because of its more demanding 
knowledge requirement  (“knowing or intending that  [the support or resources] are  to  be  used 
in preparation for,  or  in carrying out,  a  violation”  of one  or more  expressly  designated 
federal crimes)  than in  section 2339B which at least facially has no such knowledge 
requirement,  compare,  United  States  v. Sattar,  272  F.Supp.2d  348,  356-61    (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (dismissing indictment counts  under  section  2339B  on  vagueness  grounds), with, 





In any event, section 6603’s new explanation of the scope of the prohibition against 
providing “personnel” in section 2339B seems far more specific and to correspond more 
closely the courts’ concerns: 
 
     No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the term 
"personnel" unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired 
to provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more individuals (who may be or 
include himself) to work under that terrorist organization's direction or control or to 
organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization. 
Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance 
its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist 
organization's direction and control. 18 U.S.C. 2339B(h). 
 
     Finally, section 6603 addressed an ambiguity inherent in the earlier definition. In its 
earlier form, the definition of “material support or resources” in subsection 2339A 
included a mixture of tangible things and other things that might more properly be 
considered benefits or services (e.g., currency and training). Yet this defining mixture 
ended with the catch-all phrase, “and other physical assets,” 18 U.S.C. 2339A)(b)(2000 
ed.). Section 6603 responded with an amendment to section 2339A stating that “material 
support or resources” covers services and other intangible property, and that the specific 
types of property and services mentioned are simply examples.11 
 
 
     Critics might contend that by eliminating the ambiguity in favor of the more sweeping 
construction (“property, tangible or intangible, or services including” versus “property . . 
or other physical assets”) the amendment is more likely to create than dissipate 
vagueness. 
 
     The first court to pass upon the constitutionality of section 6603’s clarifying 
amendments gave them a mixed grade: section 6603 did cure the vagueness problems 
associated with use of the term “personnel,” but the terms “training” and “expert advice 
or assistance” remain unconstitutionally vague notwithstanding the amendments in 
section 6603, the term “service” which section 6603 added to the definition of prohibited 
support or resources is itself unconstitutionally vague, and the “boilerplate” First 
Amendment clause does nothing to supply greater clarity, Humanitarian Law Project v. 




counts under section 2339A on vagueness grounds); see also, United States v. Al-Arian, 308 
F.Supp.2d 1322, 1334-335 (M.D.Fla. 2004)(noting in response to a vagueness challenge to 
section 2339B that, “if this court interprets [the statute] as requiring a specific intent to further the 
illegal activities [of the foreign terrorist organization], then no constitutional problems exist”). 
 
11 “(1) the term “material support or resources” means any property, tangible or intangible, or 
service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, 
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, 
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or 
more individuals who may be or include oneself) and, transportation, AND OTHER PHYSICAL 






The First Amendment clause, in the court’s view, is “inadequate to cure potential 
vagueness issues because it does not clarify the prohibited conduct with sufficient 
definiteness for ordinary people,” id. at____ n.20. By the same token, the court felt that 
“for the average person with no background in law,” use of a definition from the Federal 
Rules of Evidence would do little to clarify the mysteries of the term “expert advice or 
assistance,” id. at__. And “[e]ven as amended [by section 6603], the term “training” is 
not sufficiently clear so that persons of ordinary intelligence can reasonably understand 
what conduct the statute prohibits,” particularly when the term “easily encompasses 
protected speech and advocacy,” id. at___. Since the term “service” is defined to include 
“training” and “expert advice or assistance,” they pull the term down with them, id. at__. 
 
Material Support: Knowledge 
 
     Section 2339B outlaws “knowing” violations. Narrowly construed, this might serve as 
a counterbalance for the suspect reach of the “material support” element. The temporary 
amendment, however, added the caveat that, “[t]o violate this paragraph, a person must 
have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in 
subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as 
defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the 
organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989), 18 U.S.C. 
2339B(a)(1),” 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1). 
 
     Justice Department officials urged the adoption of the addition in order to avoid case 
law indicating that conviction would require either proof of knowledge of the specific 
facts that led to a particular entity being designated a terrorist organization or proof of 
knowledge that the assistance provided would be used for terrorist purposes.12 The change 









12 “Recently, in the same decision in which it held the terms “personnel” and “training” to be 
unconstitutionally vague, the Ninth Circuit also held that an individual, to violate the material 
support statute, either must have knowledge of an organization’s designation as a foreign terrorist 
organization or have “knowledge of the unlawful activities that caused the organization to be so 
designated.” Humanitarian Law Project, 352 F.3d at 400. Unfortunately, one could interpret the 
latter part of this requirement to mean that a defendant must have knowledge of the facts 
contained in the generally classified, internal State Department documents, which form the basis 
for the Secretary of State’s decision to designate an organization as a foreign terrorist 
organization. Additionally, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida 
earlier this year adopted an even stricter scienter standard concluding that the government must 
prove under the material support statutes that the defendant knew that his actions would further 
the illegal activities of an designated foreign terrorist organization. See United States v. Al-Arian, 
308 F.Supp.2d 1322 (M.D.Fla. 2004),” Senate Hearings, (joint prepared statement of Assistant 





Material Support: Overseas Application 
 
     As a result of modifications by section 6603, section 2339B describes its overseas 
application more explicitly and more expansively than was once the case. It permits 
federal prosecution of an act proscribed in section 2339B and committed entirely abroad 
by a foreign national with no greater connection to the United States required than that 
we have been able to bring the offender to this country for trial, 18 U.S.C. 
2339B(d)(1)(D)(“There is jurisdiction over an offense under subsection (a) if . . . (D) 
after the conduct required for the offense occurs an offender is brought into or found in 
the Untied States, even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United 
States”). 
 
     In its other modifications to jurisdiction, section 6603 arguably did no more than 
articulate more specifically the pre-existing reach of section 2339B. Section 6603 
removed the phrase “within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States,” from section 2339B(a)(1) and provided a more explicit list of jurisdictional 
circumstances in section 2339B(d)(1), i.e., the offense is committed in whole or in part 
within the United States; the offender is a U.S. citizen, permanent resident alien, or 
habitual U.S. resident; the offense occurs in or affects U.S. interstate or foreign 
commerce; the offender is later found or brought to the U.S.; or the offender is an 
accomplice or (aider or abetter) or conspirator with respect to a violation of the section by 
another over whom the U.S. has subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
      Prior to the enactment of section 6603, section 2339B applied to anyone who acted 
“within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” when they 
provided material support to a foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1)(2000 
ed.). A person “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” arguably referred to 
American citizens, residents of this country, and entities organized under our laws.13 
Moreover, if extraterritorial jurisdiction existed over the underlying offense, it was said to 
exist over aiding and abetting the commission of the underlying offense or over 
conspiracy to commit it.14 
 
 
Federal Crimes of Terrorism 
 
      Section 2339A outlaws providing material support or resources with the intent that 
they be used for the commission of certain designated violent crimes (predicate offenses). 
Section 6603 enlarged the list of predicate offenses to include any “federal crime of 
terrorism” cited in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B). Section 2339A already covered assistance 
rendered for the commission of the following: 
 




13 United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 2005); 31 C.F.R. §500.329. Given the 
courts’ concerns of the vagueness of section 2339B noted earlier, they may have proven reluctant 
to apply the section broadly to the overseas conduct of foreign nationals even those who were 
residents of the United States. 
 
14 United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 





18 U.S.C. 37 (violence at international airports) 
18 U.S.C. 81 (arson within a federal enclave) 
18 U.S.C. 175 (biological weapons offenses) 
18 U.S.C. 229 (chemical weapons offenses) 
18 U.S.C. 351 (murder, kidnaping, or assault upon Members of Congress, etc.) 
18 U.S.C. 831(nuclear material offenses) 
18 U.S.C. 842(m) or (n) (plastic explosives offenses) 
18 U.S.C. 844(f) or (i)(bombing federal property or property in or affecting commerce) 
18 U.S.C. 930(c) (homicide with dangerous weapon in a federal facility) 
18 U.S.C. 956 (conspiracy to commit certain violent crimes overseas) 
18 U.S.C. 1114 (murder of a federal officer or employees) 
18 U.S.C. 1116 (murder of a foreign dignitary) 
18 U.S.C. 1203 (hostage taking) 
18 U.S.C. 1361 (destruction of federal property) 
18 U.S.C. 1362 (destruction of communications property) 
18 U.S.C. 1363 (destruction of property within a federal enclave) 
18 U.S.C. 1366 (destruction of an energy facility), 
18 U.S.C. 1751 (murder, kidnaping or assault of the President, etc.), 
18 U.S.C. 1992 (train wrecking) 
18 U.S.C. 1993 (violent attacks on mass transit) 
18 U.S.C. 2155 (destruction of national defense material) 
18 U.S.C. 2156 (production of defective national defense material) 
18 U.S.C. 2280 (violence against maritime navigation) 
18 U.S.C. 2281 (violence against maritime fixed platforms) 
18 U.S.C. 2332 (violence against Americans overseas) 
18 U.S.C. 2332a (weapons of mass destruction offenses) 
18 U.S.C. 2332b (multinational terrorism) 
18 U.S.C. 2332f (bombing public places or facilities) 
18 U.S.C. 2340A (torture) 
42 U.S.C. 2284 (atomic weapons offenses) 
49 U.S.C. 46502 (air piracy) 
49 U.S.C. 60123(b) (destruction of gas pipeline facilities) 
 
With the addition of the federal crimes of terrorism not already among the enumerated, 
section 2339A now also condemns assistance relating to: 
 
18 U.S.C. 175b (unlawful possession biological materials) 
18 U.S.C. 175c (smallpox virus offenses) 
18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1), (5)(A)(i)(certain computer fraud and abuse offenses) 
18 U.S.C. 2332g (anti-aircraft offenses) 
18 U.S.C. 2332h (radiological dispersal device offenses) 
18 U.S.C. 2339 (harboring terrorists) 
18 U.S.C. 2339C (financing of terrorism) 
42 U.S.C. 2122 (atomic weapons offenses) 
49 U.S.C. 46504 (2d sentence) (assault on a flight crew with a dangerous weapon) 
49 U.S.C. 46505(b)(3) or (c) (explosive or incendiary devices, or endangerment of human life 
by means of weapons, on an aircraft within U.S. jurisdiction) 
49 U.S.C. 46506 (homicide or attempted homicide aboard an aircraft within U.S. jurisdiction). 
 
     In certain  of the  earlier versions of  the intelligence reform legislation,  and in 
various free standing bills  devoted to a  similar purpose,  proponents  would have 
brought any  crime of  “international or domestic terrorism”  (18 U.S.C. 2331)  rather 
than  “any  federal  crime of   terrorism” (18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B))  within  the   circle 
of predicate  offenses.15       Use of the phrase  “international  or  domestic terrorism”16     has 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15      See e.g., Sec. 2043(a), H.R. 10, 150 Cong. Rec. H8742 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2004), also in, 
H.Rept.  No. 108-724,  pt. 5,  at  37 (2004);      Sec.  2(a),  H.R.  2858 (Rep. Green (Wis.));     Sec. 
CRS-9 
 
generated considerable debate in the context of the USA PATRIOT Act,17 and it may be 
for this reason that the more narrowly and precisely defined “federal crime of terrorism” 
cross reference was ultimately selected.  
 
     Section 6603 also introduced two crimes – 18 U.S.C. 1361 (destruction of federal 
property) and 18 U.S.C. 2156 (production of defective national defense material) – into 
the family of federal crimes of terrorism. Both crimes were already predicate offenses in 
section 2339A, so it was unnecessary to introduce them into section 2332b(g)(5)(B) in 
order to bring them within section 2339A. 
 
     Of course there are other consequences that flow from including sections 1361 and 
2156 within the definition of federal crimes of terrorism under section 2332b(g)(5)(B). 
Prior to designation as federal crimes of terrorism, violations of section 2156 were 
subject to the general five year statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. 3282; now they are 
subject to an eight year statute of limitations unless they involve the risk of death or 
serious bodily injury in which case they may be prosecuted at any time, 18 U.S.C. 3286. 
Violations of section 1361 which were already subject to an eight year statute of 
limitations, 18 U.S.C. 3286, may now be prosecuted at any time if they involve the risk 
of death or serious injury, id. 
 
     Prior to designation as a federal crime of terrorism conviction and imprisonment for 
violation of either section carried a maximum term of supervised release of not more than 
three years; the maximum term is now supervision for life or any term of years following 
a conviction for violation of either section that involves the risk of death or serious injury, 
18 U.S.C. 3583. 
 
     Prior to designation as a federal crime of terrorism, suspects charged with a violation 
of either section were entitled to normal bail procedures; now they face the rebuttable 
presumption of pre-trial detention, 18 U.S.C. 3142. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3(a), H.R. 4942 (Rep. Green (Wis.)); cf., Sec. 114(a), S. 2679 (Sen. Kyl). 
 
16 18 U.S.C. 2331(“As used in this chapter – (1) the term ‘international terrorism’ means activities 
that – (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal 
laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed 
within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended – (i) to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnaping; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are 
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which 
their perpetrators operate or seek asylum . . . 
     “(5) the term ‘domestic terrorism’ means activities that – (A) involve acts dangerous to human 
life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be 
intended – (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnaping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States.”) 
 
17 See e.g., United States Department of Justice, Dispelling the Myths: Dispelling Some of the 





     Prior to designation as a federal crime of terrorism, neither section appeared as a 
racketeering (RICO) predicate offense, 18 U.S.C. 1961 (federal racketeering statutes 
outlaw the patterned commission of a predicate offense or offenses to acquire or operate 
an enterprise in or affecting interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1961-1962). By designation 
as a RICO predicate they also become money laundering predicate offenses under 
sections 18 U.S.C. 1956, 1957 (18 U.S.C. 1956(c)(7)(A), 1957(f)(3)), a status which 




     Section 6603 also added an immunity provision under which an individual or entity 
who provides “personnel,” “training,” or “expert advice or assistance” in violation of 
section 2339B may not be prosecuted if the offense was committed with the prior 
approval of the Secretary of State and the Attorney General as long as the support cannot 
be used to carry out the various violent acts of terrorism described in 8 U.S.C. 
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (hijacking, sabotage, hostage taking, assassination and the like), 18 
U.S.C. 2339B(j). 
 
     The provision is presumably designed to encourage “stings” and other undercover 
investigations. It is not clear why it is necessary. No prosecution of 18 U.S.C. 2339B, or 
any other federal crime for that matter, is possible without the Attorney General’s 
approval, ordinarily exercised through the various United States Attorneys, F.R.Crim.P. 
7(c)(indictments must be signed by the attorney for the government). Of course, the State 































18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B) 
* * * 
(g) Definitions.– As used in this section . . . 
(5) the term “Federal crime of terrorism” means an offense that . . . 
(B) is a violation of– 
            (i) section 32 (relating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities), 37 (relating to violence at 
international airports), 81 (relating to arson within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction), 175 or 175b 
(relating to biological weapons), 175c (relating to variola virus), 229 (relating to chemical weapons), 
subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of section 351 (relating to congressional, cabinet, and Supreme Court 
assassination and kidnaping), 831 (relating to nuclear materials), 842(m) or (n) (relating to plastic 
explosives), 844(f)(2) or (3) (relating to arson and bombing of Government property risking or causing 
death), 844(i) (relating to arson and bombing of property used in interstate commerce), 930(c) (relating to 
killing or attempted killing during an attack on a Federal facility with a dangerous weapon), 956(a)(1) 
(relating to conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim persons abroad), 1030(a)(1) (relating to protection of 
computers) , 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) resulting in damage as defined in 1030(a)(5)(B)(ii) through (v) (relating to 
protection of computers), 1114 (relating to killing or attempted killing of officers and employees of the 
United States), 1116 (relating to murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, or 
internationally protected persons), 1203 (relating to hostage taking), (Sec. 6603) 1361 (relating to 
government property or contracts), 1362 (relating to destruction of communication lines, stations, or 
systems), 1363 (relating to injury to buildings or property within special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States), 1366(a)(relating to destruction of an energy facility), 1751(a), (b), (c), or 
(d) (relating to Presidential and Presidential staff assassination and kidnaping), 1992 (relating to wrecking 
trains), 1993 (relating to terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass transportation systems), 
2155 (relating to destruction of national defense materials, premises, or utilities), (Sec. 6603) 2156 (relating 
to national defense material, premises, or utilities), 2280 (relating to violence against maritime navigation), 
2281 (relating to violence against maritime fixed platforms), 2332 (relating to certain homicides and other 
violence against United States nationals occurring outside of the United States), 2332a (relating to use of 
weapons of mass destruction), 2332b (relating to acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries),  
2332f (relating to bombing of public places and facilities), 2332g (relating to missile systems designed to 
destroy aircraft), 2332h (relating to radiological dispersal devices, 2339 (relating to harboring terrorists), 
2339A (relating to providing material support to terrorists), 2339B (relating to providing material support 
to terrorist organizations), 2339C (relating to financing of terrorism, or 2340A (relating to torture) of this 
title; 
            (ii) sections 92 (relating to prohibitions governing atomic weapons) or 236 (relating to sabotage of 
nuclear facilities or fuel) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2122 or 2284); or 
            (iii) section 46502 (relating to aircraft piracy), the second sentence of section 46504 (relating to 
assault on a flight crew with a dangerous weapon), section 46505(b)(3) or (c) (relating to explosive or 
incendiary devices, or endangerment of human life by means of weapons, on aircraft), section 46506 if 
homicide or attempted homicide is involved (relating to application of certain criminal laws to acts on 
aircraft), or section 60123 (b) (relating to destruction of interstate gas or hazardous liquid pipeline facility) 
of title 49. 
 
18 U.S.C. 2339A. Providing material support to terrorists (underlined provisions expire and strike out 
provision are revived after December 31, 2006) 
            (a) Offense.– Whoever provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature, 
location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be 
used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of section 32, 37, 81, 175, 229, 351, 831, 842(m) or 
(n), 844(f) or (i), 930(c), 956, 1114, 1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 1993, 2155, 2156, 
2280, 2281, 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332f, or 2340A of this title, section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284), (Sec. 6603) or section 46502 or 60123(b) of title 49, (Sec. 6603) or any offense 
listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) (except for sections 2339A and 2339B)[,] or in preparation for, or in 
carrying out, the concealment of an escape from the commission of any such violation, or attempts or 
conspires to do such an act, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, 
if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. A violation of this 







or in any other Federal judicial district as provided by law. 
            (b) Definition.– (Sec. 6603) As used in In this section, – 
            (Sec. 6603) (1) the term "material support or resources" means (Sec. 6603) any property, tangible or 
intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, 
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, 
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (Sec. 6603) (1 or 
more individuals who may be or include oneself) and, transportation, (Sec. 6603) and other physical assets, 
except medicine or religious materials. 
            (Sec. 6603) (2) the term "training" means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, 
as opposed to general knowledge; and 
            (Sec. 6603) (3) th term "expert advice or assistance" means advice or assistance derived from 
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge. 
 
18 U.S.C. 2339B. Providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist 
organizations 
            (a) Prohibited activities.– 
            (1) Unlawful conduct.– Whoever, (Sec. 6603) within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or 
attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, 
and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. (Sec. 6603) To 
violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist 
organization (as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist 
activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the 
organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989). 
            (2) Financial institutions.– Except as authorized by the Secretary, any financial institution that 
becomes aware that it has possession of, or control over, any funds in which a foreign terrorist 
organization, or its agent, has an interest, shall– 
            (A) retain possession of, or maintain control over, such funds; and 
            (B) report to the Secretary the existence of such funds in accordance with regulations issued by the 
Secretary. 
            (b) Civil penalty.– Any financial institution that knowingly fails to comply with subsection (a)(2) 
shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount that is the greater of-- 
            (A) $50,000 per violation; or 
            (B) twice the amount of which the financial institution was required under subsection (a)(2) to 
retain possession or control. 
            (c) Injunction.– Whenever it appears to the Secretary or the Attorney General that any person is 
engaged in, or is about to engage in, any act that constitutes, or would constitute, a violation of this section, 
the Attorney General may initiate civil action in a district court of the United States to enjoin such 
violation. 
            (d) Extraterritorial jurisdiction.– (Sec. 6603) There (1) In General.– There is jurisdiction over an 
offense under subsection (a) if – 
            (Sec. 6603) (A) an offender is a national of the United States (as defined in section 101(a)(22) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22))) or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence in the United States (as defined in section 101(a)((2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
U.S.C. 1101(a)(20)))); 
            (Sec. 6603) (B) an offender is a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the United States; 
            (Sec. 6603) (C) after the conduct required for the offense occurs an offender is brought into or 
found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United States; 
            (Sec. 6603) (D) the offense occurs in whole or in part within the United States; 
            (Sec. 6603) (E) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce; 
            (Sec. 6603) (F) an offender aids or abets any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this 
paragraph in committing an offense under subsection (a) or conspires with any person over whom 
jurisdiction exists under this paragraph to commit an offense under subjection (a). 
            (Sec. 6603) (2) Extraterritorial jurisdiction.– There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an 
offense under this section. 
            (e) Investigations.– 
            (1) In general.– The Attorney General shall conduct any investigation of a possible violation of this 





            (2) Coordination with the Department of the Treasury.– The Attorney General shall work in 
coordination with the Secretary in investigations relating to– 
            (A) the compliance or noncompliance by a financial institution with the requirements of subsection 
(a)(2); and 
            (B) civil penalty proceedings authorized under subsection (b). 
            (3) Referral.– Any evidence of a criminal violation of this section arising in the course of an 
investigation by the Secretary or any other Federal agency shall be referred immediately to the Attorney 
General for further investigation. The Attorney General shall timely notify the Secretary of any action 
taken on referrals from the Secretary, and may refer investigations to the Secretary for remedial licensing or 
civil penalty action. 
            (f) Classified information in civil proceedings brought by the United States.– 
            (1) Discovery of classified information by defendants.– 
            (A) Request by United States.--In any civil proceeding under this section, upon request made ex 
parte and in writing by the United States, a court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United 
States to– 
            (i) redact specified items of classified information from documents to be introduced into evidence 
or made available to the defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 
            (ii) substitute a summary of the information for such classified documents; or 
            (iii) substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to 
prove. 
            (B) Order granting request.– If the court enters an order granting a request under this paragraph, the 
entire text of the documents to which the request relates shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the 
court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
            (C) Denial of request.– If the court enters an order denying a request of the United States under this 
paragraph, the United States may take an immediate, interlocutory appeal in accordance with paragraph (5). 
For purposes of such an appeal, the entire text of the documents to which the request relates, together with 
any transcripts of arguments made ex parte to the court in connection therewith, shall be maintained under 
seal and delivered to the appellate court. 
            (2) Introduction of classified information; precautions by court.– 
            (A) Exhibits.– To prevent unnecessary or inadvertent disclosure of classified information in a civil 
proceeding brought by the United States under this section, the United States may petition the court ex 
parte to admit, in lieu of classified writings, recordings, or photographs, one or more of the following: 
            (i) Copies of items from which classified information has been redacted. 
            (ii) Stipulations admitting relevant facts that specific classified information would tend to prove. 
            (iii) A declassified summary of the specific classified information. 
            (B) Determination by court.--The court shall grant a request under this paragraph if the court finds 
that the redacted item, stipulation, or summary is sufficient to allow the defendant to prepare a defense. 
            (3) Taking of trial testimony.– 
            (A) Objection.– During the examination of a witness in any civil proceeding brought by the United 
States under this subsection, the United States may object to any question or line of inquiry that may 
require the witness to disclose classified information not previously found to be admissible. 
            (B) Action by court.– In determining whether a response is admissible, the court shall take 
precautions to guard against the compromise of any classified information, including-- 
            (i) permitting the United States to provide the court, ex parte, with a proffer of the witness's 
response to the question or line of inquiry; and 
            (ii) requiring the defendant to provide the court with a proffer of the nature of the information that 
the defendant seeks to elicit. 
            (C) Obligation of defendant.– In any civil proceeding under this section, it shall be the defendant's 
obligation to establish the relevance and materiality of any classified information sought to be introduced. 
            (4) Appeal.– If the court enters an order denying a request of the United States under this 
subsection, the United States may take an immediate interlocutory appeal in accordance with paragraph (5). 
            (5) Interlocutory appeal.– 
            (A) Subject of appeal.– An interlocutory appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals 
from a decision or order of a district court– 
            (i) authorizing the disclosure of classified information; 









(iii) refusing a protective order sought by the United States to prevent the disclosure of classified 
information. 
            (B) Expedited consideration.– 
            (i) In general.– An appeal taken pursuant to this paragraph, either before or during trial, shall be 
expedited by the court of appeals. 
            (ii) Appeals prior to trial.– If an appeal is of an order made prior to trial, an appeal shall be taken not 
later than 10 days after the decision or order appealed from, and the trial shall not commence until the 
appeal is resolved. 
            (iii) Appeals during trial.– If an appeal is taken during trial, the trial court shall adjourn the trial 
until the appeal is resolved, and the court of appeals– 
            (I) shall hear argument on such appeal not later than 4 days after the adjournment of the trial; 
            (II) may dispense with written briefs other than the supporting materials previously submitted to the 
trial court; 
            (III) shall render its decision not later than 4 days after argument on appeal; and 
            (IV) may dispense with the issuance of a written opinion in rendering its decision. 
            (C) Effect of ruling.--An interlocutory appeal and decision shall not affect the right of the 
defendant, in a subsequent appeal from a final judgment, to claim as error reversal by the trial court on 
remand of a ruling appealed from during trial. 
            (6) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the United States from seeking protective 
orders or asserting privileges ordinarily available to the United States to protect against the disclosure of 
classified information, including the invocation of the military and State secrets privilege. 
            (g) Definitions.– As used in this section– 
            (1) the term "classified information" has the meaning given that term in section 1(a) of the 
Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.); 
            (2) the term "financial institution" has the same meaning as in section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United 
States Code; 
            (3) the term "funds" includes coin or currency of the United States or any other country, traveler's 
checks, personal checks, bank checks, money orders, stocks, bonds, debentures, drafts, letters of credit, any 
other negotiable instrument, and any electronic representation of any of the foregoing;  
            (Sec. 6603) (4) the term "material support or resources" has the same meaning as in section 2339A 
(including the definitions of "training" and "expert advice or assistance" in that section); 
            (5) the term "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Treasury; and 
            (6) the term "terrorist organization" means an organization designated as a terrorist organization 
under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
            (Sec. 6603) (h) Provision of Personnel. – No person may be prosecuted under this section in 
connection with the term "personnel" unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or 
conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more individuals (who may be or include 
himself) to work under that terrorist organization's direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or 
otherwise direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely independently of the 
foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under 
the foreign terrorist organization's direction and control. 
            (Sec. 6603) (i) Rule of Construction. – Nothing in this section shall be construed or applied so as to 
abridge the exercise of rights guaranteed under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
            (Sec. 6603) (j) Exception. – No person may prosecuted under this section in connection with the 
term[s] "personnel", "training", or "expert advice or assistance" if the provision of that material support or 
resources to a foreign terrorist organization was approved by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of 
the Attorney General. The Secretary of State may not approve the provision of any material support that 
may be used to carry out terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act). 
 
 
